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Cherry-Picking in Labor Market with Imperfect Information
*
 
We study a competitive labor market with imperfect information. In our basic model, the labor 
market consists of heterogeneous workers and ex ante identical firms who have only 
imperfect private information about workers’ productivities. Firms compete by posting wages 
in order to cherry-pick more productive workers from the applicant pool. The model predicts 
many important empirical regularities, including non-degenerated firm size distribution, 
persistent wage dispersion, and employer size-wage premium. We also consider extensions 
of the model where firms differ in either productivity or information about worker types, both 
generating assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation of worker and firm 
types. The main insight of this paper is that identical workers can get different wages 
depending on productivities of their coworkers in a competitive market with informational 
frictions. Our model also sheds light on inter-industry wage differential and sorting between 
industry and worker characteristics. 
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There exists a voluminous empirical literature about wage dispersion, particularly
in the forms of employer size-wage premium and inter-industry wage differential.
Researchers ﬁnd that large ﬁrms and certain industries pay more to observationally
equivalent workers. In addition, large ﬁrms and ﬁrms in high-wage industries are
also on average more productive, hire better workers, and make more proﬁts.1
These empirical ﬁndings are quite robust over time and across different types of
labor markets, yet hard to be rationalized. In a perfect competitive world, wages are
not expected to be correlated with ﬁrm characteristics such as size of its workforce
and industry afﬁliation. Among all proposed explanations, two types of models have
considered speciﬁc labor market frictions which lead to equilibrium wage dispersion.2
In search models, workers only know the distribution of wage offers, and thus conduct
random searches. Because workers are homogeneous, search models typically cannot
predict the sorting of ﬁrms and workers (Burdett and Mortensen 1998). Alternatively,
matching models consider interactions between heterogeneous workers and ﬁrms in
an environment with coordination friction, and generate both wage dispersion and
sorting (Shimer 2005).
This paper provides a different explanation to wage dispersion and sorting based
on imperfect information about worker productivity. Our basic intuition dates back
at least to Alfred Marshall who “recognized that workers were frequently not paid
on the basis of tasks performed. One of the reasons for this is the inability to ob-
serve the tasks perfectly - either the inputs or outputs.” (Stiglitz 2000). Despite em-
ployee signaling and employer screening (see e.g., Spence 1973 and Stiglitz 1975, and
Guasch and Weiss 1981), it is reasonable to assume that ﬁrms do not know fully the
1For studies on employer size-wage premium, see Brown and Medoff (1989), Oi and Idson (1999),
and Troske (1999). For studies on inter-industry wage differential, see Krueger and Summers (1988)
and Gibbons and Katz (1992). For more recent studies based on linked employer-employee data, see
Abowd et al. (1999).
2For theories examined and rejected, see Brown and Medoff (1989) for size-wage premium and
Krueger and Summers (1988) and Gibbons and Katz (1992) for inter-industry wage differential.
2productive capacities of workers and have to make decisions under uncertainty.3
Our main contribution in this paper is to show that imperfect information leads to
equilibrium wage dispersion in a competitive market. Furthermore, there exists size-
wage premium and assortative matching between workers and ﬁrms. Our emphasis
on informational friction in labor market can be illustrated by considering a speciﬁc
labor market - the U.S. academic market for junior economists, where qualities of job
candidates seem to be a primary concern for employers. Meanwhile, search and coor-
dination frictions seem minimal, as job candidates have a quite good understanding of
potential offers they might get from different institutions, and can send large number
of applications at nominal cost.
In the basic model, we study a one period job market with inﬁnite number of ﬁrms
that are ex ante identical, and a continuum of workers who are either of high produc-
tivity type or of low productivity type. Firms only have limited private information
about workers’ type. The job market is characterized by a sequential wage posting
game, consisting of many rounds in which ﬁrms compete by posting wage offers for
the right to hire workers. In equilibrium, ﬁrms take turns to cherry-pick workers
that they think are of high productive capabilities. Thus, ﬁrms hire workers of differ-
ent expected productivities at different wages. Firms that hire in earlier rounds pay
higher wages and draw disproportionately more high type workers.
Wage dispersion exists in equilibrium as workers of the same type are paid differ-
ently in different ﬁrms. Those who are ‘lucky’ to receive favorable assessments from
ﬁrms that hire earlier are paid more because average productivities of their cowork-
ers are higher. In a subset of equilibria in which ﬁrms hire all workers they think
are of high type, there is a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and wage. Firms
that hire earlier hire more workers as there are more high type workers in the appli-
cant pool to choose from. The model also predicts that productive workers can remain
unemployed as ﬁrms can not tell them apart from other less productive ones. The
3Models of labor market learning (e.g.: Farber and Gibbons 1996) and statistical discrimination
(e.g.: Coate and Loury 1993) are all based on the same assumption of imperfect information about
individual worker’s productivity.
3equilibrium unemployment is increasing in reservation wage.
We explore several extensions of the basic model. While there are multiple equi-
libria in the basic model, equilibrium is unique in an extended model where ﬁrms dif-
fer in productivity. In the equilibrium, ﬁrms with higher productivities offer higher
wages, hire more workers and make more proﬁts. Thus, there is a size-wage premium
for workers conditional on type. Further, even if high productivity workers and ﬁrms
are not perfectly matched, there exists positive sorting in the sense that the propor-
tion of high productivity workers in the workforce is increasing in ﬁrm productivity,
similar to Shimer (2005). In another extension we assume ﬁrms’ abilities to differen-
tiate worker types differ. In equilibrium, ﬁrms with better information always earn
higher proﬁts, but the order of hiring depends on relative scarcity of high productivity
workers in the applicant pool.4
While we only consider interactions between ﬁrms and workers in our model, the
analyses shed lights on inter-industry wage differentials as well.5 In a market with
different industries competing for talents, those with higher productivity will draw
from the worker pool ﬁrst, but only imperfectly. Thus there would exist both assorta-
tive matching and a true industry wage effect controlling for worker type, consistent
with empirical results examined in Gibbons and Katz (1992).6
It is important to emphasize from the outset that the setup of sequential wage
4When there are more low type workers than high type ones in the market, marginal beneﬁts of
cherry-picking is high, and ﬁrms with better information will hire earlier. This results in a unique
equilibrium featured by size-wage premium and assortative matching. When there are more high type
workers than low type workers, marginal beneﬁt of cherry-picking is low, equilibrium may or may not
exist.
5In this regard, our model is comparable to those by Montgomery (1991) and Shimer (2005) which
also provide insight on inter-industry wage differential.
6Gibbons and Katz (1992) report two major empirical ﬁndings using a sample of displaced workers
from the Current Population Surveys. First, wage regressions for industry-switchers suggest there is
a true industry wage effect not explained by individual unobserved heterogeneity. Second, workers
maintain some portion of their pre-displacement industry wage premiums when they are re-employed.
This is consistent with our model as those who were hired in high-wage industries are on average more
productive in unobserved dimensions.
4posting is in no way essential for our main results, although it signiﬁcantly sim-
pliﬁes the analysis. In an alternative model in which ﬁrms post wages and make
job offers simultaneously, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. But a mixed strategy
equilibrium would have similar results as the sequential model. Since workers al-
ways accept the highest wage offer, the hiring process is still characterized by ﬁrms
sequentially cherry-picking workers. Wage dispersion would remain as an equilib-
rium phenomenon due to imperfect information. We choose to adopt sequential wage
posting mainly for two reasons. First, random wage offering as in mixed strategy
equilibrium is hard to motivate.7 Second, mixed strategy equilibrium in the simul-
taneous wage posting model is very difﬁcult to handle technically. However, we do
provide a simple example in Appendix B to give readers a ﬂavor of a simultaneous
wage-posting model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model.
Section 3 extends the model by introducing productivity heterogeneity. In Section
4, we consider an extension in which ﬁrms’ abilities to assess worker types differ.
Section 5 discusses the relationship of this paper to some others in the literature.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic model
2.1 Setup
We consider a competitive labor market with no barriers to entry and exit. Firms
are ex ante identical, and have a constant return to scale production technology. They
produce the same output that are sold in a competitive market at price P, which we
normalize to 1.
There is a continuum of workers of measure one, that are of either high or low type.
High type and low type workers account for proportion α and 1 − α of the population,
7For example, to explains sales behavior, Varian (1980) considers ﬁrms playing mixed strategy in
pricing. In contrast, in terms of wage policy, ﬁrms usually are quite consistent and do not randomize
wage offers, as shown by the presence of persistent ﬁrm effects in wages.
5respectively. A high type worker can produce one unit of output if employed, while a
low type worker can produce none. The proportion of the two types and productivities
of each type are common knowledge. However, an individual’s type is unknown to
all parties, including herself.8 Workers choose the ﬁrm that offers her the highest
wage subject to the constraint that it is above her reservation wage r. There is no
application cost and workers are free to apply to all hiring ﬁrms.
When a worker applies to a ﬁrm, the ﬁrm makes a private assessment9 of the job
applicant’s type. With probability βH, a high type worker is taken as high type by the
ﬁrm, thus labeled as “h”. With probability 1−βH, she is mistakenly recognized as low
type, or labeled with “l”. Similarly, a low type worker is labeled “l” with probability βL
and “h” with probability 1−βL. We assume all ﬁrms have the same ability to differen-
tiate high type workers from low type ones, i.e., they have the same βH and βL. The
private assessments of different ﬁrms are independent,10 thus a worker recognized as
low type by one ﬁrm may be taken as high type by another.
For simplicity, we let βH = βL = β.11 When β = 1/2, ﬁrms have no ability to dif-
ferentiate high type workers from low type workers. When β = 1, ﬁrms can perfectly
distinguish high type from low type workers. When 1 > β > 1/2, ﬁrms have some but
less than perfect ability to judge worker types, and this is the case we focus on in this
paper.
Workers have the same reservation wage r, and any wage offer w < r will not be
accepted. To eliminate the uninteresting case that r is so high that no ﬁrm hires any
worker, we assume r < α. Thus, a ﬁrm could make a proﬁt by hiring all workers or a
random subset at their reservation wage r.
The job market works in a sequential manner, consisting of many rounds of auc-
8An alternative assumption is that workers know their own types, but are prohibited from send-
ing signal to ﬁrms. Our model thus departs from the signaling literature but resembles statistical
discrimination models such as Coate and Loury (1993).
9One may simply think this as a job interview.
10Our main results do not change as long as these assessments are not perfectly correlated. Assum-
ing independence simpliﬁes our analyses, though.
11None of our substantive results will change without this assumption.
6tions among hiring ﬁrms. Each round, ﬁrms that have not hired yet post wages they
are willing to offer to some workers in the remaining pool of applicants. The one with
the highest wage wins the right to hire. In case several ﬁrms tie at the highest wage,
one ﬁrm is randomly chosen as the winner. The winning ﬁrm can then offer to hire
selected workers among the remaining pool of applicants at the posted wage.12 Upon
receiving an offer from the ﬁrm, workers decide whether to accept the offer or not. Af-
ter that, the game moves to the next round with the same process repeated for ﬁrms
who have not hired and for workers who remain unemployed. The game ends when
no ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to post a wage that will be accepted. That is, ﬁrms are un-
willing to hire any unemployed worker at a wage greater than their reservation wage.
Production then starts, and active ﬁrms, those who have hired a positive measure of
workers, realize their proﬁts.
In this model, an equilibrium is characterized by the number of active ﬁrms K,
unemployment rate u, and wage distribution F(w), such that the following conditions
are satisﬁed:
1. Workers maximize the wage income they receive, provided the wage offered is
greater than their reservation wage r,
2. Firms make wage offers to maximize proﬁt,
3. Firms update beliefs about workers’ types using Bayes rule.
2.2 Main results
To start, note that because ﬁrms are ex ante identical, they must make the same
proﬁt in equilibrium. Otherwise, ﬁrms that make lower proﬁt will mimic the behavior
of those earning higher proﬁt.
A ﬁrm actually makes two choices in the recruiting process: to post a wage, and
decide whom to hire at the posted wage if it wins the right to hire. Firms face obser-
vationally two different groups of workers: those it labels as “h” and those it labels as
12We do not allow the trivial case that winning ﬁrms make offer to no workers. Thus ﬁrms always
make offers to a positive measure of workers when it wins the right to hire
7“l”. Therefore, a ﬁrm can make offers in three different ways if wins the right to hire
in a round: either to all workers randomly irrespective of the labels, or only to those
“h” workers, or only to “l” workers. The competition between ex ante identical ﬁrms,
however, forces a ﬁrm to hire only those it labels as “h”.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, a ﬁrm hires only those it labels as “h”.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. As ﬁrms compete for the right to
hire in a round, they have pushed the winning bid so high, such that hiring those
“l” workers would reduce the proﬁt of the hiring ﬁrm given its posted wage. What
this implies is that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms take turns cherry-picking more productive
workers.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, ﬁrms make zero proﬁt.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above two results suggest that ﬁrms’ expected proﬁt from each worker hired
is zero. A ﬁrm can therefore hire any portion of those it thinks as high type in equilib-
rium. In what follows we let δk ∈ (0,1] denotes the proportion of workers ﬁrm k hires
in an equilibrium.
We summarize our results so far in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exist multiple equilibria. In any equilibrium, ﬁrms pay workers
their average productivities. Also, both average productivities and wages decline in k,
the order of hiring.
Proof. The results follow directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Let ﬁrm k make offers
to δk proportion of those it labels as “h”. It sufﬁces to show that average productivity
of workers hired by ﬁrm k (denoted by Hk) is greater than that of ﬁrm k + 1 (denoted
by Hk+1), as wk = Hk and wk+1 = Hk+1. Let the applicant pool facing ﬁrm k consists ˜ nk
measure of high workers and ˜ mk measure of low type workers. We have
Hk =
˜ nkβ
˜ nkβ + ˜ mk(1 − β)
.
8The applicant pool ﬁrm k+1 will choose from consists of ˜ nk+1 = (1−δkβ)˜ nk measure of
high type workers and ˜ mk+1 = [1 − δk(1 − β)]˜ mk measure of low type workers. Hence,
Hk+1 =
(1 − δkβ)˜ nkβ
(1 − δkβ)˜ nkβ + [1 − δk(1 − β)]˜ mk(1 − β)
.
Clearly, Hk > Hk+1 given that 1 > β > 1/2 and 0 < δk ≤ 1.
It remains to show that there exists at least two active ﬁrms in the market. This
is guaranteed by the assumption that r < α. Note that the average productivity of
workers that ﬁrm 2 labels as “h” is
H2 =
(1 − δ1β)αβ
(1 − δ1β)αβ + [1 − δ1(1 − β)](1 − α)(1 − β)
≥ α,
which is greater than the reservation wage r, so ﬁrm 2 will be active.
We next analyze a subset of equilibria in which ﬁrms hire every worker they think
is of high type, i.e., δk = 1 for all k. It is not hard to show that as long as δk = δ ∈ (0,1]
for all k, the corresponding equilibria have the same properties. However, for ease of
exposition, we only look at the special case of δ = 1. This is formally stated in the
following assumption13.
Assumption 1. Firms treat observationally identical workers in the same way. That
is, if a ﬁrm makes an offer to any worker, then it must also make the same offer to other
workers who have the same expected productivity from the ﬁrm’s perspective.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium is characterized by employer
size-wage premium. Firms that offer higher wages (both unconditionally and condi-
tional on type) also hire more workers.
Proof. Note this is just the special case with δk = 1 as considered in Proposition 1. In
general, the average productivity of workers at ﬁrm k is
Hk =
αβ(1 − β)k−1
αβ(1 − β)k−1 + (1 − α)βk−1(1 − β)
.
13In an environment when ﬁrms know worker types perfectly, Shimer (2005) similarly assumes that
ﬁrms’ wage offers may be conditional on a worker’s type but not on her individual identity.
9The measure of workers ﬁrm k hires equals Nk = α(1 − β)k−1β + (1 − α)βk−1(1 − β).
Clearly, both Hk and Nk decrease as k increases. Hence, there is a positive relationship
between ﬁrm size and wage.
Again, note that as long as δk = δ < 1 for all k, there is a size-wage effect in
equilibrium, but with Hk and Nk formulated differently.
After ﬁrms 1,2,··· ,k−1,k have hired, the measure of workers remains to be hired




α(1 − β)k + (1 − α)βk =
α[(1 − β)/β]k
α[(1 − β)/β]k + (1 − α)
.
Note that both Rk and αk+1 are strictly decreasing in k. As more and more ﬁrms have
hired, the proportion of high type workers in the remaining pool decreases, so does
the measure of unemployed workers. At certain point, it becomes unproﬁtable for
another ﬁrm to hire, as the expected beneﬁt from hiring a worker the ﬁrm recognizes
as high type drops below the reservation wage r. This implies that the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms K is determined by the condition
HK ≥ r > HK+1. (1)
Corollary 1. In the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2, there exists a ﬁnite
number of active ﬁrms. Also, number of active ﬁrms K is decreasing in workers’ reser-
vation wage r, while equilibrium unemployment rate is increasing in r.
Proof. To see that number of active ﬁrms is ﬁnite, note that Hk strictly decreases in
k and goes to zero as k goes to inﬁnite. Because HK ≥ r > HK+1, K has to be a
ﬁnite number. To show the second part, we note that the measure of workers remain
unemployed after round k equals Rk = α(1−β)k+(1−α)βk. The measure of unemployed
workers equals RK. As K decreases in r, RK increases in r. Hence, we conclude that
the measure of unemployed workers, also the unemployment rate, strictly increases
in the reservation wage r.
In the equilibrium, there are α(1−β)K measure of unemployed high type workers
and (1 − α)βK measure of unemployed low type workers, both increasing with the
10reservation wage r. In addition, the proportion of high type workers among unem-
ployed workers, α(1 − β)K/[α(1 − β)K + (1 − α)βK] decreases in K and thus, increases
in the reservation wage r. As one interpretation of r could be the minimum wage,
our model predicts that an increase in the binding minimum wage results in larger
proportion of high productivity workers to be unemployed.
3 Heterogeneity in Firm’s Productivity
In the real world, ﬁrms are obviously quite different in many dimensions. The
implications of such heterogeneities on labor market outcomes deserve serious exam-
ination. Therefore, this section extends the basic model and allow ﬁrms to be different
ex ante in terms of productivity. For notational purpose, we index ﬁrms by the rank
order of their productivities, or production technology. Thus ﬁrm i has production
technology ψi which ranks ith among all ﬁrms. Worker productivity and ﬁrm pro-
duction technology enter into the production function multiplicatively. A high type
worker hired by ﬁrm i produces ψi units of output, while a low type worker still pro-
duces none.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, active ﬁrms’ proﬁts strictly increase in their productivity,
i.e., for two ﬁrms, ﬁrm i with ψi and ﬁrm j with ψj, both of which hire a positive
measure of workers in an equilibrium, ψi > ψj implies Πi > Πj.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which ﬁrm j hires in the k-th round at wk
and employs ¯ nk measure of high type workers and ¯ mk measure of low type workers.
Firm j’s total proﬁt is Πj = ¯ nkψj − (¯ nk + ¯ mk)wk. Firm i could at least mimic ﬁrm j by
offering wk +  and hiring in the k-th round, thus realize a proﬁt of Πk
i = ¯ nkψi − (¯ nk +
¯ mk)wk > Πj. Hence we have Πi ≥ Πk
i > Πj.
Lemma 3 indicates that some ﬁrms get positive proﬁt in equilibrium. As a result,
these ﬁrms will hire every worker labelled as “h”. Hence, in equilibrium, there is
ﬁnite number of active ﬁrms (hire a positive measure of workers) as the reservation
11r > 0. If we denote the total number of active ﬁrms as K, this result also implies that
active ﬁrms are ﬁrms 1,2,...,K.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, the wage offers by active ﬁrms strictly decrease. That is, if
wk is the wage offer in the k-th round, then wk > wk+1 for any k.
Proof. We prove this result by contradiction. Suppose there were one equilibrium in
which the equilibrium wage offers for two consecutive rounds are such that wk ≤ wk+1.
Let the applicant pool for the k-th round consists of ˜ nk measure of high type, ˜ mk
measure of low type workers. Let ﬁrm j be the one that hires in the (k + 1)-round,
facing ˜ nk+1 measure of high type and ˜ mk+1 measure of low type workers. Clearly
˜ nk+1 + ˜ mk+1 < ˜ nk + ˜ mk and ˜ nk+1/˜ mk+1 < ˜ nk/˜ mk because the ﬁrm that hires in round k
proportionally select better workers from the pool. Thus ﬁrm j has a clear incentive
to deviate by offering wk+ and get the right to hire in round k, where it faces strictly
better applicants pool (in terms of both total measure of workers and proportion of
high productivity workers) and lower wages.
When the difference in production technology is too large, one ﬁrm could dominate
the market. For example, it could be the case that ψ1 is big enough such that
ψ1
α(1 − β)
α(1 − β) + (1 − α)β
> ψ2H2;
ﬁrm 1 can proﬁtably hire every job applicant at a wage w ≥ ψ2H2. The rest of ﬁrms
hire no worker in equilibrium. The next assumption rules out this possibility.








α(1 − β)β + (1 − α)β2
α(1 − β)β + (1 − α)(1 − β)2.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 2, no ﬁrm hires any worker labeled as “l” in equilib-
rium.
Proof. Consider ﬁrm k that hires in the k-th round, facing an applicant pool with αk
proportion of high type and 1−αk proportion of low type workers. It is necessary that
wk ≥
αkβψK+1
αkβ+(1−αk)(1−β), where ﬁrm K + 1 is an inactive ﬁrm, as otherwise it could offer a
wage wk + ε and realizes a positive proﬁt.
12In this case, however, it will not be proﬁtable for any ﬁrm to hire “l” workers. This
is so as the expected productivities of those workers are strictly less than the wage,
αk(1 − β)ψk
αk(1 − β) + (1 − αk)β
<
αkβψK+1
αkβ + (1 − αk)(1 − β)
≤ wk.







< Ω(α,β) < Ω(αk,β). Note
that for any k > 1 we have αk < α as the average productivities of the applicant pool
deteriorate over time.
Lemma 6. In equilibrium, high productivity ﬁrms always hire before low productivity
ﬁrms.
Proof. First, note that Lemma 3 indicates that all active ﬁrms except the last (ﬁrm
K) make strictly positive proﬁts, and they hire every worker labeled as “h”.
Now suppose Lemma 6 were not true, then there exists at least one equilibrium in
which ﬁrm j hires in the k-th round and ﬁrm i hires in the k + 1-th round, but with
ψj < ψi.
Let the applicant pool facing ﬁrm j in the k-th round consists ˜ nk measure of high
type, ˜ mk measure of low type workers. The expected proﬁt for ﬁrm j is
Π
k
j = ˜ nkβψj − [˜ nkβ + ˜ mk(1 − β)]wk.
However, by waiting to hire in the k + 1-th round at wage wk+1, ﬁrm j would get
Π
k+1
j = ˜ nk(1 − β)βψj − [˜ nk(1 − β)β + ˜ mkβ(1 − β)]wk+1.
Meanwhile,ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is:
Π
k+1
i = ˜ nk(1 − β)βψi − [˜ nk(1 − β)β + ˜ mkβ(1 − β)]wk+1.
By hiring in the k-th round at wage wk, it would get
Π
k
i = ˜ nkβψi − [˜ nkβ + ˜ mk(1 − β)]wk.






j . Substituting the
above proﬁt equations and combining the two inequalities, we have ψj ≥ ψi, which
contradicts the condition ψj < ψi.
13We next determine the number of ﬁrms K and the behavior of ﬁrm K. Because all
ﬁrms hiring before K select workers they label as “h”, the applicant pool facing ﬁrm
K consists of (1 − β)K−1α high type workers and βK−1(1 − α) low type workers. This
indicates that the number of active ﬁrms is determined by the condition
α(1 − β)K−1βψK
α(1 − β)K−1β + (1 − α)βK−1(1 − β)
≥ r >
α(1 − β)KβψK+1
α(1 − β)Kβ + (1 − α)βK(1 − β)
. (2)
In competing the right to hire in the K-th round, ﬁrm K + 1, who has the highest





α(1 − β)K−1β + (1 − α)βK−1(1 − β)
.
Consequently, any active ﬁrm who wins the right to hire in this round has to offer at
least this much. However, if wK
K+1 happens to be less than workers’ reservation wage,
then the ﬁrm has to offer at least r. Clearly, the ﬁrm does not have any incentive to





α(1 − β)K−1β + (1 − α)βK−1(1 − β)

. (3)
In the special case of
r =
α(1 − β)K−1βψK
α(1 − β)K−1β + (1 − α)βK−1(1 − β)
, (4)
ﬁrm K makes zero proﬁt and may hire any positive proportion of workers it labels as
“h”. Otherwise it makes positive proﬁt and hires all “h” workers. Following the same




makes the ﬁrm hiring in the k + 1 round indifferent between hiring in the k-th and
k+1-th rounds. The following proposition proves formally that this is an equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 2, there exists a unique equilibrium with the fol-
lowing properties:
(a) There are K active ﬁrms, with K determined by the condition (2).
(b) Firms hire according to the rank order of their productivities. That is, ﬁrm k
(≤ K) with ψk hires in the k-th round.
14(c) Active ﬁrms hire all workers they think are of high type but none they think are
of low type. The last hiring ﬁrm K, though, hire any proportion of workers it considers
as high type should condition (4) holds.
(d) Wages decrease in each round. Further, they are recursively determined starting
from wK in (3). In general wk is determined such that ﬁrm k + 1 is just indifferent
between hiring in the k+1-th round at wage wk+1 and hiring in the k-th round at wage
wk.
(e) All active ﬁrms make positive proﬁts except ﬁrm K, which makes zero proﬁt if
condition (4) happens to hold. Total proﬁts decrease in k.
(f) The equilibrium exhibits a positive relationship between ﬁrm sizes and wages.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This extended model also sheds light on inter-industry wage differential and sort-
ing between workers and industries. In a labor market in which different industries
compete for workers, those who have higher productivities ﬁnd it proﬁtable to offer
higher wages in order to select better workers, due to the complementarity between
worker and ﬁrm productivities. Thus our model also has the ﬂavor of efﬁciency wage
models as discussed by Krueger and Summers (1988). Note that the size-wage rela-
tionship no longer needs to hold here as the size of an industry can be considered as
exogenously given by technology and market demand.
4 Heterogeneity in Firm’s Abilities to Assess Worker
Types
In this section we consider a different extension of the basic model, allowing ﬁrms
to have the same productivity but different abilities to tell high type workers from
low type ones. We index ﬁrms by the rank order of their information parameter β, i.e,
for two ﬁrms i and j, i < j implies that βi > βj. For all i, βi ∈ (1/2,1).
15Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the winning ﬁrm at each round hires all workers it
labels as “h”, none of those it labels as “l”. Wages offered decline in k, the order of
hiring. Also, active ﬁrms’ proﬁt Πi increases in ﬁrm’s information parameter βi.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As in the previous section, equilibrium wage offers are determined in a backward
way starting from the last round. Given the result of the proposition, we know that
active ﬁrms in the market could only be ﬁrms 1,2,...,K. Let the ﬁrm who hires in the






k=1(1 − βk)]βK+1/(1 − βj)
α[
QK
k=1(1 − βk)]βK+1/(1 − βj) + (1 − α)[
QK
k=1 βk](1 − βK+1)/βj
)
.
That is, ﬁrm j hiring in the last round has to pay the maximum of reservation wage r
and the highest wage ﬁrm K + 1 (which has the best information among all inactive
ﬁrms) is willing to offer.
Similarly, the equilibrium wage offered for the (K − 1)-th round will be such that
the ﬁrm hiring in the K-th round is indifferent between winning the K-th round and
the (K − 1)-th round. This is also true for any round k. The following preliminary
result shows how the order or hiring will be determined:
Lemma 7. At any round k, let the measure of high type and low type workers be ˜ nk
and ˜ mk, respectively. Suppose in equilibrium ﬁrm i and j hire at round k and k + 1,
respectively. If ˜ nk < (>)˜ mk, then it must be that βi > (<)βj.
Proof. See Appendix A.
At each round, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms decide whether to win in the current round
by biding the highest wage or not to win. A ﬁrm expects to pay lower wage by waiting
for a few rounds. However, waiting also lowers the quality of workers it gets. Lemma 7
indicates that how a ﬁrm balance the trade-off in a round depends on the composition
of job applicants in the pool.
In what follows, we separately discuss two cases according to the initial composi-
tion of workers in the market: there are more low type workers, α < 1/2, and there
16are more high type workers, α > 1/2. We also brieﬂy discuss the case when α = 1/2 in
Appendix A (Lemma A5 and A6).
4.1 More low type workers
When α < 1/2, there are relatively few high type workers in the market initially.
Securing a better applicant pool becomes the main concern for every ﬁrm that intends
to hire. Those with informational advantage will bid more aggressively for the right
to hire earlier. Hence, ﬁrms with larger βs always hire earlier than ﬁrms with smaller
ones. The order of hiring is uniquely determined. We summarize the result as follows:
Proposition 5. When α < 1/2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which ﬁrms hire




i=1 (1 − βi)βK
α
QK−1
i=1 (1 − βi)βK + (1 − α)
QK−1
i=1 βi(1 − βK)






i=1(1 − βi)βK+1 + (1 − α)
QK
i=1 βi(1 − βK+1)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Deﬁnition 1. The distribution of β is not too dispersed if for any two consecutively
ranked ﬁrms i,i + 1 with βi and βi+1 respectively, (1 − βi)/(1 − βi+1) ≥ βi.
Corollary 2. Suppose α < 1/2. There exists a positive relationship between ﬁrm sizes
and wages if the distribution of β is not too dispersed.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We also show in Appendix A (Lemma A6) that in the case of α = 1/2, hiring in
the order of β, (1,2,...K), is still an equilibrium. However, in certain cases there
also exists another equilibrium in which ﬁrm 2 hires ﬁrst, i.e, ﬁrms hire in the order
(2,1,...K).
174.2 More high type workers
When α > 1/2, the quality of job applicants in the pool is so good that ﬁrm 1 with
the best information may afford to wait for one more round. Waiting costs ﬁrm 1 in
terms of the quality of applicants. However, given the facts that the initial pool is very
good and the rest of ﬁrms are not as good as ﬁrm 1 in selecting high type workers,
the remaining pool should not be too bad. It turns out that in this case, the beneﬁt
from paying a lower wage will more than offset the cost from reduced quality. Firm 1
therefore does not want to hire in the ﬁrst round.
Proposition 6. When 1/2 < α ≤ β2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which ﬁrms
hire in the order of (2,1,...K), where the number of active ﬁrms K is determined by the
condition in (5).
Proof. See Appendix A.
As α > 1/2, ﬁrm 1 is willing to let ﬁrm 2 hire ﬁrst, as ﬁrm 2’s ability in selecting
high types workers is not as good as ﬁrm 1’s. Firm 1 ﬁnds the wage w2 a bargain price
given the quality of the remaining applicants. In addition, the condition α ≤ β2 also
implies that after ﬁrm 2 has hired in the ﬁrst round, there are more low type workers
in the remaining pool, and thus, ﬁrm 1 has no incentives to postpone hiring again.
This makes the hiring order unique and stable.
On the other hand, when the initial pool of workers is so good, α > β2, no hiring
order is stable. Even after ﬁrm 2 has hired, the remaining pool still consists of more
high type than low type workers, ﬁrm 1 again would have an incentive to postpone
hiring, unless there are only two rounds, K = 2. However, if ﬁrms other than ﬁrm 1
were to hire in the second round, ﬁrm 2 would rather not to hire in the ﬁrst round.
But no other ﬁrm would not want to hire in the ﬁrst round either. They are not as
good as ﬁrm 1 and 2 in choosing the high type workers, thus the wage has to be paid
is the ﬁrst round is simply too high to appeal to them.
Of course, when there are just one or two active ﬁrms, this will not be a problem.
First, when K = 1, only ﬁrm 1 will hire and the rest of ﬁrms remain inactive.14 Next,
14This happens under condition that
αβ1
αβ1+(1−α)(1−β1) ≥ r >
α(1−β1)β2
α(1−β1)β2+(1−α)β1(1−β2). Firm 1 pay a
18when K = 2, both ﬁrm 1 and 2 are active in the market. The only possible hiring
order is ﬁrm 2 hires before ﬁrm 1, which is stable.15 But with more than two ﬁrms
(K ≥ 3), equilibrium does not exist, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. When α > β2, no equilibrium exists if the number of active ﬁrms
K ≥ 3, in which K is determined by condition (5).
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Related Literature
Our model is closely related to search and matching models. Although these models
sometimes generate similar implications as we do, the types of frictions under con-
sideration are quite different. Random search models typically assume that workers
do not fully know potential jobs, thus have to either wait for a time period or incur
a direct cost to sample from the pool of job offers. In the on-the-job search model of
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), workers search randomly and gradually move from









α(1 − β2)β1 + (1 − α)β2(1 − β1)
≥ r >
α(1 − β1)(1 − β2)β3
α(1 − β1)(1 − β2)β3 + (1 − α)β1β2(1 − β3)
.





α(1 − β2)β3 + (1 − α)β2(1 − β3)

,
makes a proﬁt of
Π2
1 = α(1 − β2)β1 − [α(1 − β2)β1 + (1 − α)β2(1 − β1)]w2,
Note that w1 is determined by the condition Π1
1 = Π2
1, where Π1
1 = αβ1 −[αβ1 +(1−α)(1−β1)]w1. Thus
w1 =
αβ1β2 + [α(1 − β2)β1 + (1 − α)β2(1 − β1)]w2
αβ1 + (1 − α)(1 − β1)
,
Π1
2 = αβ2 − [αβ2 + (1 − α)(1 − β2)]w1,
Π2
2 = α(1 − β1)β2 − [α(1 − β1)β2 + (1 − α)β1(1 − β2)]w2.
We can check that Π1
2 > Π2
2, thus as long as the condition Π1
2 ≥ 0 holds, there exists an equilibrium in
which ﬁrm 2 hires before ﬁrm 1.
19low paying jobs to high paying jobs. Identical ﬁrms offer different wages in the equi-
librium, as those who offer higher wages attract more workers at the expense of en-
joying lower per worker proﬁt. Thus the model also generates size-wage premium in
the equilibrium, However, their underlying intuition is quite different than ours. Be-
cause workers are homogeneous in their model, large ﬁrms pay more to keep a larger
workforce. In our model, large ﬁrms are willing to pay more because they want to
select better workers from a heterogeneous population of job candidates.
The directed search literature restricts the number of jobs a worker can apply at a
time, thus creates a coordination problem among fellow job seekers. In Shimer (2005),
heterogeneous workers and ﬁrms interact in a static environment. The model gen-
erates wage dispersion as well as positive sorting of workers and ﬁrms. However, it
does not predict size-wage premium as a ﬁrm is just characterized by one job vacancy.
On the other hand, Shimer (2005) captures the coexistence of unemployment and job
vacancies, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Shimer (2005) also consider more
general production functions (see also Shi 2002a). Similarly, Acemoglu and Shimer
(2000) study how labor market coordination friction also induce ex ante identical
ﬁrms to adopt different technologies. Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher
(2009) extend the Shimer model and allow workers to send multiple (but still ﬁnite
number of) applications. Shi (2002b) generates size-wage premium based on coordi-
nation frictions in both product market and labor market.
Many macroeconomic models of labor market rely on an aggregate matching func-
tion without specifying the exact source of market frictions (see Pissarides 2000).
The micro-foundations of a well-performed matching function includes random search
(urn-ball model), coordination friction, the stock-ﬂow analysis of Coles and Smith
(1998), and the model of Lagos (2000) which considers optimal decisions across spa-
tially distinct locations.
The paper falls into a large literature on labor market information that dates back
at least to Stigler (1962), who studies information about jobs for workers and initiated
the whole search literature. Spence (1973) shows how high productivity job appli-
cants could send costly signals to prospective employers in order to be separated from
20low productivity workers. Similarly, the statistical discrimination literature (for ex-
ample, Coate and Loury 1993, Moro and Norman 2004) analyzes how personal char-
acteristics such as race and gender can be used to form conditional expectations in
labor markets with imperfection information, and lead to self-fulﬁlling vicious cycles.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) study wage dynamics following initial hiring as employer
gradually learn about worker productivity. More recently, Grossman (2004) demon-
strates that the combination of imperfect information with national differences in
the distribution of worker talents can be an independent source of comparative ad-
vantage, and lead to trade in two otherwise identical countries. Grossman (2004)
motivates imperfect information with team work in production and labels this “in-
complete labor contract”, as no contract can be written conditional on each individual
worker’s marginal product.
Recently, there is also a growing literature exploring the role of informational
friction in the framework of search. This includes Guerrieri (2008), Faig and Jerez
(2005), and Guerrieri et al. (2008). These models combine search (coordination) fric-
tion with imperfect information, thus are different from our model. Their predictions
are also different from ours.
6 Conclusions
Information plays a very important role in many labor markets. With perfect infor-
mation, the law of one price must hold, with workers of identical productive capabil-
ities being paid equal wages. However, real world labor contracts are seldom perfect
as employers only have imperfect knowledge of workers’ productivities. In this case,
competing force is not enough to ensure workers to be paid according to their talents.
Workers of different abilities can be paid the same wage, while workers of the same
ability can be paid differently.
In this paper we formalize this intuition and analyze a model of imperfect infor-
mation in a competitive setting. Firms compete by offering higher wages in order
to “cherry-pick” better workers. Our model thus offers an alternative way to under-
21stand many important labor market phenomenons, including non-degenerated ﬁrm
size distribution, persistent wage dispersions, employer size-wage premium, and pos-
itive sorting of ﬁrms and workers. The model also sheds light on inter-industry wage
differential and sorting between workers and industries.
Finally, our model is highly stylized and meant to be so. Similar to Shimer (2005),
the model needs to be extended to a dynamic framework to make serious empirical
predictions. In a dynamic model, ﬁrms gradually learn more about worker produc-
tivities and wages will evolve accordingly, as in Farber and Gibbons (1996). It would
also be feasible to combine imperfect information with other labor market frictions in
order to provide a more accurate description of actual labor markets.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. We analyze ﬁrm k’s hiring problem, who wins the right to hire
in the k-th round, facing a pool of workers of mass Rk−1. First, we need to decide the
24wage the ﬁrm has to post to win the right to hire in round k. Let αk be the proportion
of high type workers among the pool of workers to be hired in this round. When k = 1,
α1 = α. For ﬁrm k, it faces two distinct groups of workers, those it recognizes as high
type, who has an average productivities of
Hk =
αkβ
αkβ + (1 − αk)(1 − β)
,
and those it recognizes as low type, who has an average productivities of
Hk =
αk(1 − β)
αk(1 − β) + (1 − αk)β
.
Note that the equal proﬁt condition implies that ﬁrm k can not offer a wage wk <
Hk, since with wk < Hk, ﬁrm k would hire all remaining workers in the applicant pool
and earn a positive proﬁt. The rest of the ﬁrms have no workers to hire, thus only
make zero proﬁt.
Next, offering wk = Hk and hiring ψ proportion of those it recognizes as low type
can not be part of any equilibrium either. Note that in this case, ﬁrm k would still
hire every worker it recognizes as high type. Suppose ﬁrm k also hires ψ proportion
of low types at wk, it would get a total proﬁt of
˜ Πk = Rk−1[αkβ + (1 − αk)(1 − β)]

αkβ
αkβ + (1 − αk)(1 − β)
−
αk(1 − β)
αk(1 − β) + (1 − αk)β

.
Following similar arguments, the ﬁrm k + 1 that hires immediately after ﬁrm k can
at most get a proﬁt of




αk(1 − β)2 + (1 − αk)β2

,
Which corresponds to the case that ψ = 0 and ﬁrm k+1 makes a wage offer that equals
to the average productivities of workers it labels as “l” (note that based on previous
argument offering wk+1 < Hk+1 is not possible). It follows that
˜ Πk − ˜ Πk+1
Rk−1
= αk(1 − αk)(2β − 1)

αk(1 − β)3 + (1 − αk)β3
[αk(1 − β) + (1 − αk)β][αk(1 − β)2 + (1 − αk)β2]

> 0.
That is, ﬁrm k makes higher proﬁt than ﬁrm k + 1. This violates the equal proﬁt
condition. Thus, ﬁrm k offers wk = Hk can not be supported in any equilibrium either.
25Therefore, ﬁrm k has to offer a wage wk > Hk. This makes ﬁrm k not to hire any
worker it recognizes as low type, as hiring them will incur loss for the ﬁrm.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let’s consider the generic ﬁrm k again. To make a positive proﬁt,
it must offer wk < Hk. Proﬁt maximization also requires ﬁrm k to hire every worker
it labels as “h”. As the same argument applies to all ﬁrms, all participating ﬁrms
will hire all workers they think are of high type when it is their turn to hire. The
proportion of high type workers after ﬁrm k hired in the remaining pool equals
αk+1 =
α(1 − β)k
α(1 − β)k + (1 − α)βk,
and the average productivity of those ﬁrm k + 1 recognize as high type is
Hk+1 =
α(1 − β)kβ
α(1 − β)kβ + (1 − α)βk(1 − β)
.
As Hk+1 goes to zero in the limit with k, for any r > 0, there exists a k such that for all
k ≥ k, Hk < r. Thus ﬁrms hiring after the k-th round would make a loss as they must
offer at least r to attract any worker.
Therefore, in any equilibrium in which ﬁrms make positive proﬁt, there could only
be a ﬁnite number of active ﬁrms. This violates the equal proﬁt condition because
non-active ﬁrms make zero proﬁt. Thus we conclude that all ﬁrms must make zero
proﬁt in any equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. The uniqueness of such an equilibrium, if it exists, is guar-
anteed by the previous results, in particular, Lemma 6. Thus we only need to establish
its existence.
Given other ﬁrms’ strategies, we show that there is no incentive for any ﬁrm k to
deviate. First, ﬁrm k has no incentive to hire earlier than the k-th round. For any














= β(1 − β)
k−h−1α(ψk − ψk−h) − β(1 − β)
k−h−2α(ψk − ψk−h) > 0
26Next, ﬁrm k has no incentives to hire later than the k-th round. For any h ≥ 0, wages














= β(1 − β)
k+h−1α(ψk − ψk+h+1) − β(1 − β)
k+hα(ψk − ψk+h+1) > 0
Given our previous discussions, ﬁrm k hires β(1 − β)k−1α high type workers and
(1−β)βk−1(1−α) low type workers. The only exception is that for ﬁrm K, if condition
(4) holds, ﬁrm K makes zero proﬁt, thus it could hire δβ(1−β)K−1α high type workers
and δ(1 − β)βK−1(1 − α) low type workers in which 0 < δ ≤ 1. (f) simply follows from
(c) and (d).
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the result with Lemma A1 to Lemma A4.
Lemma A1. In any equilibrium, no ﬁrm hires all remaining workers when it wins the
right to hire.
Proof. We show this by contradiction. Suppose ﬁrm j hires all workers at round k at
wage wk, then there must be some ﬁrms end up being inactive. Also, it must be that
wk = αk, the average productivities of the applicant pool, such that ﬁrm j only breaks
even. Otherwise an inactive ﬁrm could bid wk + , hire all workers at round k, and
make strictly positive proﬁt.
In this case, an inactive ﬁrm could deviate by offering wk +  at round k. It could
then hire all workers it labels as “h” and make a strictly positive proﬁt, as the average
productivities of those workers will be greater than αk.
Lemma A2. In any equilibrium, proﬁts of active ﬁrms strictly increase in their β.
That is, for two ﬁrms i and j that both hire a positive measure of workers, βi > βj
implies Πi > Πj.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose there is an equilibrium in which ﬁrm j hires
in the k-th round from an applicant pool with ˜ nk measure of high type workers and
27˜ mk measure of low type workers, at a wage wk. Suppose ﬁrm j hires ¯ δk > 0 proportion
of workers it labels as “h”, and hires δk proportion of those it labels as “l”.
Based on Lemma A1, it must be that proﬁts from “l” workers are zero even when
those workers are hired. Thus, ﬁrm j’s total proﬁt is
Π
k
j = ¯ δk˜ nkβj − ¯ δk[˜ nkβj + ˜ mk(1 − βj)]wk ≥ 0.
As βi > βj, it can be shown that
˜ nkβi − [˜ nkβi + ˜ mk(1 − βi)]wk > ˜ nkβj − [˜ nkβj + ˜ mk(1 − βj)]wk ≥ 0.
This is because ˜ nk ≥ ˜ nkwk + ˜ mkwk
1−βj
βj > ˜ nkwk > ˜ nkwk − ˜ mkwk.
Therefore, in equilibrium ﬁrm i could at least offer wk at the k-th round and hire
all workers it labels as “h”. Hence
Πi ≥ Π
k
i = ˜ nkβj − [˜ nkβj + ˜ mk(1 − βj)]wk > Π
k
j,
and ﬁrm i earns a higher proﬁt than ﬁrm j in equilibrium.
Lemma A3. In any equilibrium, number of active ﬁrms K is ﬁnite. In addition, all
active ﬁrms except the one with worst information among them (which is ﬁrm K) hire
all workers they label as “h”. No active ﬁrm hires any worker it labels as “l”.
Proof. Following Lemma A2, all active ﬁrms except the one with lowest β must earn
strictly positive proﬁt. Thus to maximize proﬁt, it is necessary for them to hire all “h”
workers given the wage offers. This ensures that worker average productivity strictly
deteriorates each round (except for maybe when ﬁrm K hires). As reservation wage r
is positive, number of active ﬁrms K must be ﬁnite.
To see why ﬁrms don’t hire “l” workers, note that in any round it is necessary
that wage wk is greater than the average productivity of all workers αk, otherwise
an inactive ﬁrm can enter by offering wk +  and earn a positive proﬁt by hiring all
workers. As the average productivity of workers the ﬁrm recognizes as low type is
strictly less than αk, it is not proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to hire any one of them at wk.
Lemma A4. Wage offers strictly decrease in any equilibrium. That is, for any consec-
utive rounds k and k + 1, wk > wk+1.
28Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose wk ≤ wk+1. Let the applicant pool
for the k-th round consists of ˜ nk measure of high type and ˜ mk measure of low type
workers. Let ﬁrms i and j hire in the k-th and (k+1)-th rounds, respectively. Firm j’s
proﬁt from hiring in the (k + 1)-th round equals
Π
k+1
j = ˜ nk(1 − βi)βj − [˜ nk(1 − βi)βj + ˜ mkβi(1 − βj)]wk+1.
As wk ≤ wk+1, it can shown that ﬁrm j would deviate to hire in the k-th round at
wk +  and earn a higher level of proﬁt.
Π
k







βj ≥ ˜ nkβi − [˜ nkβi + ˜ mk(1 − βi)
1−βj
βj ]wk > Πk
i > 0. Hence, there
exists no equilibrium such that wk ≤ wk+1.
Proof of Lemma 7. We prove this by contradiction, supposing ﬁrm i hires in the k-th
round and ﬁrm j hires in the k+1-th round, with βi < (>)βj (note that by assumption
no two βs are equal).
Note that ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is Πk
i = ˜ nkβi − [˜ nkβi + ˜ mk(1 − βi)]wk and ﬁrm j’s proﬁt is
Π
k+1
j = ˜ nk(1−βi)βj −[˜ nk(1−βi)βj +mkβi(1−βj)]wk+1. Consider the possible deviating
case where ﬁrm j hires in the k-th round at wk and ﬁrm i hires in the k + 1-th round






j in order for the equilibrium to
hold.
However, note that (Πk
i − Π
k+1
i ) − (Πk
j − Π
k+1






j ) = (βi −
βj)(˜ nk − ˜ mk)(wk+1 − wk) < 0, as βi < (>)βj, ˜ nk < (>)˜ mk and wk+1 < wk (Lemma A4). In







i , and there is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. We ﬁrst prove the existence of the equilibrium, i.e., for any
active ﬁrm k, hiring in the k-th round is its best response when all other ﬁrms are
hiring in the order of β. Note that when only one ﬁrm deviate in the order of hiring,
the sequence of wages stay unchanged.




To see this, let there be ˜ nk measure of high type and ˜ mk measure of low type workers
at the beginning of round k. Thus,
Π
k
k = ˜ nkβk − [˜ nkβk + ˜ mk(1 − βk)]wk.
While if ﬁrm k deviates to round k + 1,
Π
k+1
k = ˜ nk(1 − βk+1)βk − [˜ nk(1 − βk+1)βk + ˜ mkβk+1(1 − βk)]wk+1.
Similarly, we have that Πk
k+1 = ˜ nkβk+1 − [˜ nkβk+1 + ˜ mk(1 − βk+1)]wk and Π
k+1
k+1 =













k+1] = (βk − βk+1)(˜ mk − ˜ nk)(wk − wk+1) > 0.
The ﬁrst equality follows because Πk
k+1 = Π
k+1
k+1. The last inequality follows because
α < 1/2 ensures that ˜ mk > ˜ nk for any k. Also, βk > βk+1 and wk > wk+1 (Lemma A4).




















































Deﬁne A = α
1−βk
Qh−1









k = βk(1 − βh)βh+1A − βk(1 − βh)A[wh − (1 − βh+1)wh+1]
− (1 − βk)βhB[wh − βh+1wh+1].











































h+1 =βh+1βh(1 − βk)A − βh+1(1 − βk)A[wh − (1 − βh)wh+1]















= A[βh+1(βk − βh) − (βk(1 − βh) − βh+1(1 − βk))wh + (βk(1 − βh)(1 − βh+1)
− (1 − βh)βh+1(1 − βk))wh+1]
+ B[((1 − βh+1)βk − βh(1 − βk))wh − ((1 − βh+1)βhβk − βh(1 − βk)βh+1)wh+1].
Note that α < 1/2, βi > 1/2 for all i and h > k imply A < B. Also, because βk > βh
and βh+1 < 1, we have (1−βh+1)βk −βh(1−βk) > (1−βh+1)βhβk −βh(1−βk)βh+1, which
together with the condition that wh > wh+1 (Lemma A4) ensures the last term of the






≥ A[βh+1(βk − βh) − (βk(1 − βh) − βh+1(1 − βk))wh + (βk(1 − βh)(1 − βh+1)
− (1 − βh)βh+1(1 − βk))wh+1]
+ A[((1 − βh+1)βk − βh(1 − βk))wh − ((1 − βh+1)βhβk − βh(1 − βk)βh+1)wh+1]
= A[βh+1(βk − βh) + (2βk − 1)(βh − βh+1)wh − (2βh − 1)(βk − βh+1)wh+1]
> A[βh+1(βk − βh) + (2βk − 1)(βh − βh+1)wh − (2βh − 1)(βk − βh+1)wh]
= A[βh+1(βk − βh) − (2βh+1 − 1)(βk − βh)wh] > 0.
31The last inequality holds as wh < 1 and βh+1 < 1.
Next, we consider ﬁrm k’s (k ≥ 2) incentive to hire in earlier rounds. Note that for












































(1 − βi) + α
τ−2 Y
i=1

















(1 − βi) + α
τ−2 Y
i=1













When τ = k, this shows that Πk
k = Π
k−1
k . Therefore, ﬁrm k has no incentive to hire in
earlier rounds.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium follows naturally from Lemma 7, as there are
always less high type workers than low type workers in each round, no other order of
hiring can exist.
Also, given the order of hiring, ﬁrm K hires α
QK−1
i=1 (1−βi)βK measure of high type
workers and (1−α)
QK−1









i=1 βi(1−βK) ≥ r. Also, ﬁrm K +1 and all other ﬁrms
with lower β are not able to pay at least the reservation wage to hire anyone from








i=1 βi(1−βK+1) ≥ r. These two
conditions collectively determine number of active ﬁrms K.






i=1 (1 − βk)]βK
α[
QK−1
i=1 (1 − βk)]βK + (1 − α)[
QK−1
i=1 βk](1 − βK)
)
,




















Note that the difference equals
Nk − Nk+1 = (βk − βk+1 + βkβk+1)α
k−1 Y
i=1


















Note that βk − βk+1 + βkβk+1 > 0 as βk > βk+1 and 1/2 < βk < 1. Therefore, under the
condition that (1−βk)/(1−βk+1) ≥ βk, Nk −Nk+1 > 0, which implies that the measure
of workers decreases in the order of hiring. Because wages also decrease in the order
of hiring (Lemma A4), there is a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and wage.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove the result in two steps. First, we need to show
that ﬁrms 1,3,4,...,K have no incentives to deviate. Note that at the beginning of
the second round, we have α2 ≤ 1/2 as α ≤ β2, thus the subgame after ﬁrm 2 has
hired is an equilibrium as we have analyzed before. We only need to show that ﬁrms
1,3,4,...,K have no incentives to deviate to the ﬁrst round. This is trivial for ﬁrm 1
as it is indifferent between hiring in the ﬁrst round and the second round, Π2
1 = Π1
1.
For ﬁrm k ≥ 3, the same proof in Proposition 5 would suggest that Π2
k ≤ Πk
k, i.e.,
ﬁrm k has no incentive to deviate to the second round. Thus we only need to show
that Π2
k − Π1





























Next, we show that ﬁrm 2 has no incentives to deviate to later rounds, i.e., Π1
2 ≥ Πh
2











2 for h ≥ 2.
The proﬁts for ﬁrm 2 to hire in the h-th and the (h + 1)-th round are, respectively,
Π
h
2 = αβ2(1 − β1)
h Y
i=3
(1 − βi) − [αβ2(1 − β1)
h Y
i=3






2 = αβ2(1 − β1)
h+1 Y
i=3
(1 − βi) − [αβ2(1 − β1)
h+1 Y
i=3









2 = αβ2βh+1(1 − β1)
h Y
i=3
(1 − βi) − αβ2(1 − β1)
h Y
i=3
(1 − βi)[wh − (1 − βh+1)wh+1]




















(1 − βj)[wh − (1 − βh)wh+1] (A.2)





















= α(1 − β1)
h−1 Y
i=3




βi[(β2(1 − βh+1) − βh(1 − β2))wh − βh(β2 − βh+1)wh+1].
34Note that β2 > βh, βh+1 < 1 and wh > wh+1 implies that (β2(1 − βh+1) − βh(1 −
β2))wh − βh(β2 − βh+1)wh+1 > 0. In addition, β2 ≥ α implies α(1 − β1)
Qh−1









≥ α(1 − β1)
h−1 Y
i=3




[(β2(1 − βh+1) − βh(1 − β2))wh − βh(β2 − βh+1)wh+1]
= α(1 − β1)
h−1 Y
j=3
(1 − βi){βh+1(β2 − βh) + [(2β2 − 1)(βh − βh+1)wh] − (2βh − 1)(β2 − βh+1)wh+1}
> α(1 − β1)
h−1 Y
j=3
(1 − βi){βh+1(β2 − βh) + [(2β2 − 1)(βh − βh+1)wh] − (2βh − 1)(β2 − βh+1)wh}
= α(1 − β1)
h−1 Y
j=3
(1 − βi){βh+1(β2 − βh) − [(2βh+1 − 1)(β2 − βh)wh]}
> α(1 − β1)
h−1 Y
j=3
(1 − βi){βh+1(β2 − βh) − [(2βh+1 − 1)(β2 − βh)]}
= α(1 − β1)
h−1 Y
j=3
(1 − βi)[(β2 − βh)(1 − βh+1)] > 0.
This concludes the proof that the aforementioned equilibrium is indeed an equi-
librium. The uniqueness follows from the proof of Proposition 5 and also Lemma 7.
Also, the number of active ﬁrms K is determined by condition (5).
Proof of Proposition 7. We demonstrate the result in two steps. First, let the ﬁrms
hiring in the ﬁrst three rounds be i, j and k, respectively. Note that since α > 1/2,
ﬁrm 1 cannot be the one hiring in the ﬁrst round. Any ﬁrm other than ﬁrm 1 hiring in
the ﬁrst round would lead to α2 > 1/2 as α > β2. Therefore, we know that βi < βj < βk
based on Lemma 7.





j. But the two indifference conditions would imply Π1
k >
Π3





αβi − α[w1 − (1 − βi)w2] − (1 − α)
1−βj




















as (1 − βj)/βj < (1 − βk)/βk.
Lemma A5. When α = 1/2, there exists no equilibrium in which the hiring order is
other than (1,2,...K) or (2,1,...K).
Proof. Note that from the second round, αk < 1/2 will always hold and ﬁrms will hire
in the order of βs. Therefore, we only need to show that ﬁrm i > 2 hiring in the
ﬁrst round is not an equilibrium. Suppose instead that ﬁrms are hiring in the order
(i,1,2,...).
In that case, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt when hiring in the second round is
Π
2
1 = αβ1(1−βi)−[αβ1(1−βi)+(1−α)(1−β1)βi]w2 = 0.5β1(1−βi)−0.5[β1+βi−2βiβ1]w2,
and its proﬁt when deviating to the ﬁrst round is
Π
1
1 = αβ1 − [αβ1 + (1 − α)(1 − β1)]w1 = 0.5β1 − 0.5w1.
The condition that Π2
1 = Π1
1 implies that w1 = β1βi + [β1 + βi − 2βiβ1]w2.
For ﬁrm i, the proﬁt it makes when hires in the ﬁrst round is
Π
1
i = αβi − [αβi + (1 − α)(1 − βi)]w1 = 0.5βi − 0.5w1,
Consider ﬁrm 2 that hires in the third round.
Π
3
2 = αβ2(1 − βi)(1 − β1) − [αβ2(1 − βi)(1 − β1) + (1 − α)(1 − β2)β1βi]w3,
and its proﬁt when deviating to the second round is
Π
2
2 = αβ2(1 − βi) − [αβ2(1 − βi) + (1 − α)(1 − β2)βi]w2,
If ﬁrm i deviate to the third round, then its proﬁt is
Π
3


















= 0.5[(βi − β2)(1 − β1) + (βi − β2)(2β1 − 1)w3]
− 0.5[βi(1 − β1) − β2(1 − βi) + [(2βi − 1)(β1 − β2)]w2]
= 0.5[β2(β1 − βi) + (βi − β2)(2β1 − 1)w3 − (2βi − 1)(β1 − β2)w2]
> 0.5[β2(β1 − βi) − (β2 − βi)(2β1 − 1) − (2βi − 1)(β1 − β2)]
= 0.5[(β1 − βi)(1 − β2)] > 0
This shows that no ﬁrm other than ﬁrm 2 could possibly hire in the ﬁrst round.
Thus, in any possible equilibrium, the order of hiring is either 2,1,...K or 1,2,...K.
Lemma A6. When α = 1/2, in the case of K > 2, the number of active ﬁrms K is
determined by the condition in (5). Hiring in the order of (1,2,...K) is always an
equilibrium. In addition, under certain conditions, there is another equilibrium in
which ﬁrms hire in the order (2,1,...K).
Proof. We consider cases with different K. To start, when K = 1, obviously only ﬁrm
1 is active in the market. This happens under condition that
αβ1
αβ1+(1−α)(1−β1) ≥ r >
α(1−β1)β2







1−β2. Firm 1 pay a wage of w1 = max{r,β2}.
When K = 2, both ﬁrm 1 and 2 are active in the market. Suppose ﬁrm 1 hires
before ﬁrm 2, then it must be true that
(1 − β1)β2
(1 − β1)β2 + β1(1 − β2)
≥ r >
(1 − β1)(1 − β2)β3





(1 − β1)β3 + β1(1 − β3)

,
ﬁrm 2 makes a proﬁt of
Π
2
2 = 0.5(1 − β1)β2 − 0.5[(1 − β1)β2 + β1(1 − β2)]w2,
Note that w1 is determined by the condition Π1
2 = Π2
2, where Π1
2 = 0.5β2 − 0.5w1. Thus
Π
1
1 = 0.5β1 − 0.5w1,
37Π
2
1 = 0.5(1 − β2)β1 − 0.5[(1 − β2)β1 + β2(1 − β1)]w2,
Note that Π1
1 = Π2
1, thus ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to deviate.
Alternatively, suppose ﬁrm 2 hires before ﬁrm 1, then
(1 − β2)β1
(1 − β2)β1 + β2(1 − β1)
≥ r >
(1 − β1)(1 − β2)β3





(1 − β2)β3 + β2(1 − β3)

,
ﬁrm 1 makes a proﬁt of
Π
2
1 = 0.5(1 − β2)β1 − 0.5[(1 − β2)β1 + β2(1 − β1)]w2,
Note that w1 is determined by the condition Π1
1 = Π2
1, where Π1
1 = 0.5β1 − 0.5w1. Thus
Π
1
2 = 0.5β2 − 0.5w1,
Π
2
2 = 0.5(1 − β1)β2 − 0.5[(1 − β1)β2 + β1(1 − β2)]w2,
Note that we need the condition Π1








(1 − β2)β3 + β2(1 − β3)

≤ β2. (A.3)
When K > 2, it is obvious that number of active ﬁrms K should be determined by
condition (5), following the same logic as in Proposition 5. Also, hiring order (1,2,...K)
is an equilibrium follows the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 5, with only very
minor modiﬁcations. Thus, we only need to lay out the conditions under which hiring
order (2,1,...K) is also an equilibrium.
First, note that from the second round αk < 1/2, thus hiring must happen in the
order of βs in any equilibrium. We only need to show that: 1) no ﬁrms other than ﬁrm
2 has the incentive to deviate to hire in the ﬁrst round, and 2) ﬁrm 2 has no incentive
to deviate to hire in later rounds.
Clearly, ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to deviate to the ﬁrst round since Π2
1 = Π1
1. To see
that ﬁrm k > 2, who hires in the k-th round, has no incentive to hire in the ﬁrst round,
38note that Π1
k = 0.5βk − 0.5w1, while Π2














1] = 0.5(β1 − βk)[β2 − (2β2 − 1)w2] > 0,
where the last inequality follows because β2 < 1 and w2 < 1.




k and ﬁrm k has no
incentive to deviate to the ﬁrst round.







1] = 0, ﬁrm 2 has no incentive to deviate to the second round.
Second, note that Proposition 5 also ensures that Πk
2 > Π
k+1
2 for k ≥ 3. Therefore, we


















= 0.5[(β2 − β3)(1 − β1) + (β2 − β3)(2β1 − 1)w3]
− 0.5[β2(1 − β1) − β3(1 − β2) + [(2β3 − 1)(β1 − β3)]w2]
= 0.5[β3(β1 − β2) + (β2 − β3)(2β1 − 1)w3 − (2β2 − 1)(β1 − β3)w2]
Thus as long as Π3
2 ≤ Π1
2, the hiring order of (2,1,...K) is an equilibrium. Because
Π3
3 = Π2
3 implies w2 =
β1β3(1−β2)+[(1−β1)(1−β2)β3+β1β2(1−β3)]w3
β2+β3−2β2β3 . This implies the following
condition needs to hold.
β3(β1 − β2) + (β2 − β3)(2β1 − 1)w3
(2β2 − 1)(β1 − β3)
≤
β1β3(1 − β2) + [(1 − β1)(1 − β2)β3 + β1β2(1 − β3)]w3
β2 + β3 − 2β2β3
.
(A.4)
Note that w3 is determined by all the βs and K.
Appendix B
Here we consider a simultaneous wage posting model. Free entry implies that
ﬁrms make zero proﬁt in equilibrium. There is a continuum of workers of two types,
α proportion of high type and 1 − α proportion of low type. Firms make simultaneous
job offers to workers they intend to hire at offered wages. Upon receiving offers,
39workers decide which ﬁrm’s offer to accept. Workers always take the highest wage
offer, provided that it is greater or equal to the reservation wage r. Production starts
after the ﬁrm-worker matching process is completed.
First, note that no two ﬁrms can offer the same wage. The intuition is similar to
that in Varian (1980) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Suppose both ﬁrm A and
B offer the same wage w. Let the measures of high type and low type workers who
receive offer from ﬁrm A, but no other offer higher than w, be nA and mA, respectively.
Among those workers, nAβ high type workers and mA(1−β) low type workers will also
receive offer from ﬁrm B. In equilibrium, only half of those workers who receive offers
from both ﬁrms will choose to accept ﬁrm A’s offer. Thus, the average productivities
of workers ﬁrm A hires at equilibrium is
nA(1−β/2)
nA(1−β/2)+mA[1−(1−β)/2]. However, ﬁrm A could
deviate by offering w +  and get all workers that also receive an offer from ﬁrm B.




Second, we show that no pure strategy equilibrium exist. Because no two ﬁrms
offer the same wages and workers only accept the highest offer received, the equilib-
rium can be analyzed as if the game is sequential, i.e., ﬁrms who post higher wages
hire ﬁrst. Let the ﬁrm who offer the highest wage (w1) and the second highest wage
(w2) be denoted as ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, respectively. Clearly, ﬁrm 1 will send offer to
those workers it labels as “h” (or a random subset), and hire workers with average
productivity H1 =
αβ
αβ+(1−α)(1−β). The zero proﬁt condition guarantees that w1 = H1.
Suppose ﬁrm 1 hires δ (0 < δ ≤ 1) proportion of workers it labels as “h”, then average
productivity of workers hired by ﬁrm 2 will be H2 =
α(1−δβ)β
α(1−δβ)β+(1−α)[1−δ(1−β)](1−β). Note
that H2 < H1 and H2 = w2. However, in this case ﬁrm 1 could deviate by offering only
w2 +  and still be able to hire the same workers, thus make a positive proﬁt.
We then consider the possibility of mixed strategy equilibrium. Note that the
intuition of no two ﬁrms offer the same wage still holds, thus there should be no
point mass in the support of ﬁrms’ wage offers. Even though ﬁrms randomly choose
one wage to post each time, in any realization, we could still rank the wage offers
for all active ﬁrms from the highest to the lowest (w1 > ... > wk > ... > wK). The
40hiring process is still characterized by cherry picking as described in Proposition 1,
and the average productivities of workers hired by those ﬁrms will be decreasing
(H1 > ... > Hk > ... > HK). Thus in the equilibrium there still exists wage dispersion
and size-wage premium (under Assumption 1). The only difference is that wk = Hk no
longer holds. Rather, the expected proﬁt (across all realizations) of all ﬁrms should be
zero.
Finally, we give a simple example of mixed strategy equilibrium (similar to Varian
1980). Let Assumption 1 holds, and H1 > H2 = r > H3, where Hk =
αβ(1−β)k−1
αβ(1−β)k−1+(1−α)βk−1(1−β)
for k = 1,2,3. Note ﬁrst that at most two ﬁrms can be active in equilibrium, as the
ﬁrm offering the third largest wage can only hire workers with average productivities
of H3, which is lower than the reservation wage.
We only consider symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, in which both active ﬁrms
randomly choose a wage to post from a CDF F(x) = prob(w < x) in the support [w, ¯ w].
It is clear that ¯ w = H1. Note that offering a wage greater than H1 is a strictly
dominated strategy. Also, if ¯ w < H1, then an inactive ﬁrm could deviate to offer
something between ¯ w and H1, thus make a positive proﬁt.
Similarly, w = r. Note w > r is also a strictly dominated strategy, as both active
ﬁrms can make more proﬁt by lowering w. But w cannot be lower than r as well, at it
is the reservation wage.
Since there are no point masses in the equilibrium density, the cumulative distri-




{πhF(w) + πl(1 − F(w))}dF(w),
where πh = αβ−(αβ+(1−α)(1−β))w is the total proﬁt if ﬁrm i post the highest wage,
πl = (α − w)(1 − β)β is total proﬁt if ﬁrm i post the second highest wage.
All wages that are offered with positive density must yield the same expected
proﬁt zero for the ﬁrm. Otherwise, the ﬁrm could proﬁtably increase the frequency
with which the more proﬁtable wage were posted. This condition indicates
πhF(w) + πl(1 − F(w) = 0.
41Simpliﬁcation gives
F(w) =
(w − α)(1 − β)β
αβ2 − (αβ2 + (1 − α)(1 − β)2)w
.
Note that F(r) = 0, and F(H1) = 1.
In equilibrium, both ﬁrms play mixed strategy, offering w following the distrib-
ution F(w). Alll other ﬁrms remain inactive, and have no incentive to be active by
playing a mixed strategy based on F(w), as the expected proﬁt will be negative. Since
F(·) is a continuous distribution, the case of a tie can be ignored without loss of gen-
erality. In any equilibrium outcome, the two ﬁrms will offer different wages. The ﬁrm
who offers the highest wage will hire more workers, thus there exists wage dispersion
and size-wage premium in the simultaneous game.
42